Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Demand for clientelism in low-income countries distorts political incentives and constrains growth. Informal workers are seen as a strong clientelist constituency because they rely on forbearance and targeted benefits, yet they also constitute an electoral bloc that could coordinate in support of beneficial programmatic policies. We examine whether—and how—such demand for clientelism can be attenuated. We implement an information experiment with firm owners ahead of Senegal’s 2022 local elections, during which an upstart political faction campaigned on programmatic reform. Reminding informal workers of their coordination capacity reduced engagement with dominant clientelistic networks. This shift did not translate into support for programmatic alternatives but into political disengagement. Demand for clientelism can be mitigated, but programmatic mobilization remains a challenge.
Authors: Abhit Bhandari, Lucas Borba, Jessica Gottlieb
Institutions: Vanderbilt University, University of Houston
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $3,550
OpenAlex ID: W7222758487