Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: This paper introduces the concept of imaginative injustice as a form of epistemic injustice.While testimonial injustice concerns credibility deficits and hermeneutical injustice concerns gaps in collective interpretive resources, imaginative injustice targets a dimension of epistemic life: epistemic role-viability, the sustained possibility of regarding oneself as an ordinary participant in shared epistemic practices whose contributions could receive uptake.I argue that epistemic self-conception, the practical orientation through which subjects experience themselves as capable of participating in practices of knowing, is not merely an individual psychological capacity but is socially shaped and unevenly sustained.Imaginative injustice occurs when epistemic role-viability is systematically eroded along identity lines.This structural erosion can manifest experientially in two ways: uptake-atrophy, where agents continue to participate but lose the expectation of uptake, and participatory foreclosure, where epistemic participation itself ceases to appear viable.I distinguish imaginative injustice from testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, showing how it can both precede and result from them, and I identify the affective mechanisms through which this erosion operates, including shame, fear, and the social stratification of curiosity.The paper concludes by arguing that epistemic justice requires institutional conditions that secure equal epistemic role-viability across social positions, not formal access to speech.
Author: Acar, H. Melisa
Institution: University of Glasgow
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7222854516
