Type: article
Abstract: AI coding agents lower the cost of organization-specific software adaptation for both organizations and vendors, yet equal access need not produce symmetric sourcing effects. We model how residual control shapes adaptation investment when organization-specific changes cannot be fully specified in advance. Vendor control induces underinvestment that lowers joint value, and repricing cannot recover the lost surplus. Internal development therefore expands selectively, especially when adaptation matters more and governance burdens are lower. When the vendor offers low-assurance and assurance-certified options, higher agent capability reduces low-assurance demand and raises the assurance-certified share of remaining customers. Imperfect internal delegation weakens this shift, while better vendor-side specification and contracting can attenuate or locally reverse it. The model shows when symmetric access to agentic AI yields asymmetric sourcing responses across software categories.
Authors: Kim, Namil, Choi, Sukwoong
Language: English
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7222991326