Power-accountability Asymmetry and Behavioral Reproduction Principle: a Candidate Systems-theoretic Framework for Power, Coercive Behavior, Accumulated Harm, and Institutional Feedback
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: This paper proposes the Power-Accountability Asymmetry and Behavioral Reproduction Principle (PAABRP), a candidate systems-theoretic framework for investigating whether and how changes in relative power, accountability, behavioral incentives, accumulated harm, and institutional correction are associated with changes in coercive behavior between social groups. Its associated dynamic formulation is termed the Power-Accountability Feedback Cycle Model (PAFCM).The framework distinguishes three phenomena that must not be treated as equivalent: redistribution of relative power, reproduction of previously observed coercive behavior, and recurring transitions between configurations of power and behavior. A redistribution of power does not necessarily produce behavioral reproduction, and behavioral reproduction does not necessarily generate a recurring cycle.The proposed model represents a two-group interaction using five state variables: relative power, accountability asymmetry, behavioral asymmetry, differential accumulated harm, and institutional corrective response. A coupled nonlinear differential-equation system expresses candidate feedback relationships among these variables. The formulation is designed to generate testable hypotheses rather than to establish a universal social law.The paper specifies operational definitions, candidate equations, parameter interpretations, equilibrium conditions, local stability criteria, possible conditions for oscillatory behavior, a multi-group extension, empirical hypotheses, falsification criteria, alternative explanations, and a staged validation protocol. It also identifies limitations arising from measurement, causal identification, aggregation, historical heterogeneity, institutional context, and model specification.No claim is made that the proposed system necessarily exhibits a limit cycle, that all groups reproduce oppressive behavior when their power increases, or that social history follows a universal sequence of victimization and domination. Such conclusions would require evidence beyond conceptual argument or simulation.
Author: Shan, Shamiul Hoque
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7224097068