Spatio-Temporal Provenance Guard: Detecting Privilege Escalation Attacks That Exploit Spatio-Temporal Data Loss in Multi-Agent MCP Environments
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Multi-agent systems using the Model Context Protocol (MCP) can lose provenance across storage and session boundaries. This spatio-temporal data loss enables an adversary on the ingestion path to distribute an outbound-transfer directive across incomplete records for a privileged agent to assemble and execute. We propose Spatio-Temporal Provenance Guard (STPG), a gateway defense that persists connector provenance, regroups records by source lineage, and authorizes an external routing call only when a trusted directive is witnessed to target that destination and passes a deterministic structural check. Comparisons use evidence adapters on a common kernel, not published defenses. On a Google Cloud testbed with Gemini agents, STPG blocked all 648 attacks and passed 69 of 71 approved transfers. It matched all specified decisions on a policy challenge set and 190/260 on a frozen set from a second model family. Requiring two witness models to agree reduced false authorizations on descriptive notices from 53 to 25 of 150. On a second held-out set generated after all settings were frozen, conformance was 215/260, rising to 229/260 with witness agreement and an extended resolver. Limits remain in reference resolution, descriptive notices, and trusted rewrites, so the results support bounded, destination-level enforcement on synthetic data.
Source: Applied Sciences
DOI: 10.3390/app162211449
Authors: Deuk-Hun Kim, Jin Kwak
Language: English
Topic: Access Control and Trust
Subfield: Computer Networks and Communications
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $2,896
Awards: G9001396966, G9001397662
OpenAlex ID: W7224189761
