Tax Financing and Blockholder Incentives: A Conditional Principal–Agent Application
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: This article connects personal tax financing to a blockholder principal–agent model, distinguishing economic exposure from voting authority. A reproducible example compares share sales and personal borrowing before and after repayment, with an equivalent non-tax invoice as a constructed control. It separates fixed assessments from realization charges and examines how conditional incentives depend on financing terms, decision timing and retained rights. Dated Meta and proposed Anthropic arrangements motivate these distinctions without calibrating the model. The article preserves null cases and authority boundaries while identifying limits concerning optimal financing, tax-law application and governance outcomes. It opens a research programme on ownership, control and the objectives of decision-makers.
Author: Bell, Peter
Language: English
Subfield: Accounting
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7224578797