Blockchain traceability investment in agricultural supply chains: cost sharing, fairness concerns, and channel performance
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Introduction This study investigates optimal decisions in a blockchain-enabled agricultural supply chain under alternative cost-sharing and fairness-concern configurations. Methods A two-stage Stackelberg game is developed with a manufacturer as the leader and a retailer as the follower. The manufacturer determines the wholesale price and blockchain traceability level, after which the retailer determines the retail price and marketing effort. Fairness-adjusted utilities are constructed using generalized Nash-bargaining reference profits. Four scenarios are examined: no cost sharing with fairness-neutral parties (NN), no cost sharing with a fairness-concerned manufacturer (NM), cost sharing with fairness-neutral parties (SN), and cost sharing with a fairness-concerned retailer (SR). Closed-form equilibria and comparative-static results are derived and examined numerically. Results Under fairness neutrality, retailer cost sharing reduces the manufacturer's effective investment burden and increases wholesale price, retail price, traceability level, and marketing effort. It benefits the manufacturer but reduces retailer profit at sufficiently high sharing ratios; total supply-chain profit increases only below a threshold. Without cost sharing, stronger manufacturer fairness concern raises the wholesale price but reduces traceability investment and both parties' monetary profits. Manufacturer utility may initially increase before declining beyond a critical fairness threshold. Under cost sharing, retailer fairness concern lowers the retail price, marketing effort, traceability investment, and manufacturer profit. Its effects on retailer and total supply-chain profit depend on the cost-sharing ratio, bargaining power, and fairness concern. Discussion Within the configurations considered, moderate fairness concern can partly correct the incentive distortion caused by a high cost-sharing ratio, whereas excessive fairness concern weakens demand and channel efficiency. These findings highlight the importance of balancing investment incentives and distributional concerns when designing blockchain cost-sharing contracts.
Author: Yueli Lu
Language: English
Subfield: Management Information Systems
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $2,353
OpenAlex ID: W7224948185