Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Qualia have long occupied a central place in the science and philosophy of consciousness, often invoked as the subjective residue that eludes physical explanation. In this paper, we argue that the classical concept faces serious explanatory and ontological difficulties. We present 10 reasons for setting it aside: (1) its unstable causal status; (2) the regress of the inner observer; (3) the absence of a determinate neuroscientific target; (4) the lack of autonomous empirical evidence for a quale as such; (5) its epistemic redundancy and duplication of properties already attributed to the world; (6) the reflexive architecture that makes experience available in a first-person format; (7) the limits and reconstructive character of introspection; (8) linguistic reification; (9) the apparent immediacy of experience; and (10) the persistence of residual dualist pictures. We do not deny that experiences occur, differ qualitatively, and are undergone from a first-person point of view. We reject the stronger interpretation of those differences as intrinsic, ineffable, immediately self-revealing, and metaphysically private properties located in an inner mental domain.
Source: Frontiers in Psychology
Authors: Riccardo Manzotti, Pietro Perconti
Institutions: IULM University, University of Messina
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $3,801
OpenAlex ID: W7225144202