The Multiparty Trap in Indonesia's Presidential System: Between Democracy and Governmental Stability
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: This article examines the structural tension between presidentialism and multiparty fragmentation in Indonesia, focusing on the institutional implications of Constitutional Court Decision Number 62/PUU-XXII/2024. Using a normative juridical method with statutory, conceptual, and comparative approaches, this study develops the concept of the Representation–Stability Paradox to explain how increased political inclusiveness may undermine executive effectiveness. The findings reveal that the recalibration of electoral thresholds enhances democratic representation but simultaneously intensifies legislative fragmentation, weakens coalition durability, and increases the risk of executive–legislative deadlock. Furthermore, the persistence of pragmatic, non-programmatic coalitions contributes to policy inconsistency and delays in decision-making processes. To address these challenges, this article introduces the concept of Purified Presidentialism, emphasizing institutional synchronization between executive authority and legislative support. As an operational mechanism, the study proposes the Policy-Based Coalition Contract (PBCC), designed to bind coalition actors to measurable policy commitments. This research contributes to the literature by shifting the focus from electoral simplification to coalition institutionalization, offering a framework to reconcile democratic inclusiveness with effective governance.
Source: Jurnal Hukum
Institution: Universitas Widya Gama Malang
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W7225183978