Invertibility of the Lottery Equilibrium
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Auction theorists have long recognized that allocation mechanisms differ not only in outcomes but also in the information they reveal. Revelation of a winner’s valuation, for example, may affect subsequent dealings with lenders, suppliers, regulators, labor unions, and other third parties. We examine the analogous question for the lottery contest with complete information and asymmetric values, in which a prize is awarded probabilistically on the basis of contestants’ efforts. We show that the equilibrium effort profile uniquely identifies the valuations of all active contestants. If information revelation to third parties carries economic consequences in contest environments, this transparency may itself have implications for equilibrium behavior.
Source: Games
DOI: 10.3390/g17060061
Authors: Sean F. Ellermeyer, Jesse A. Schwartz
Institution: Kennesaw State University
Language: English
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $1,930
OpenAlex ID: W7225194235