Worker Bargaining Power, Unemployment Risk, and Inequality in a Heterogeneous-Agent Search Model
Year: 2026
Type: dissertation
Abstract: This paper studies how worker bargaining power affects wages, unemployment, labor supply, income inequality, and wealth inequality in a continuous-time heterogeneous-agent model with search frictions and incomplete markets. Households differ in assets, employment status, and production role. Employed workers choose consumption, savings, and hours, while unemployed workers search for jobs and self-insure through asset accumulation. Firms post vacancies, jobs are formed through a pooled matching function, and wages are determined by role-specific Nash bargaining. This structure allows bargaining power to affect not only average wages and unemployment, but also the joint distribution of wages, hours, income, and wealth. The results show that higher worker bargaining power has competing distributional effects. Among employed workers, stronger bargaining power raises average wages and labor income while reducing wage, hours, and earnings inequality. However, higher bargaining power also lowers firm surplus, reduces vacancy creation, and raises unemployment. As a result, overall income inequality can rise even as inequality among employed workers falls. The model also shows that wealth inequality and income-wealth sorting need not move together: higher bargaining power can reduce the wealth Gini while strengthening the association between high income and high asset holdings. Policy functions and welfare comparisons reveal that the effects of bargaining power depend strongly on employment status, productivity, and asset holdings. Low-asset and low-productivity households gain substantially when bargaining power rises from low to moderate levels, but further increases generate smaller gains and can reduce welfare, especially for unemployed households. The findings suggest that worker bargaining power is neither simply equalizing nor disequalizing. Instead, it reallocates both income and labor-market risk. Policies that strengthen workers' wage positions are therefore most effective when combined with measures that support job creation and insure households against unemployment risk.
Source: University of Chicago
DOI: 10.6082/4zxg8-3hw30
Author: Zhu, Cheetah
Institution: University of Chicago
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7225242620
