Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: In infinitely or indefinitely repeated games with noisy signals about others’ actions, sustaining cooperation is difficult. Theoretical work shows that cooperation can be maintained if the signals are correlated and the degree of correlation depends on the actions. In this study, we implement such an information structure in a laboratory experiment and investigate whether subjects are able to sustain cooperation by conditioning their behavior on it. A substantial number of subjects adopt strategies accounting for the correlation, but this does not increase cooperation compared to a control treatment without correlation, as behavior with independent signals is more lenient when players can communicate, while without communication cooperation remains low in both settings.
Source: Experimental Economics
Authors: Yongping Bao, Fabian Dvorak, Sebastian Fehrler
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,550
Awards: G2088408388, G2463333092
OpenAlex ID: W7225389355