Work

Multiplayer Stopping Games with a Conditionally Atomless Filtration

Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Stopping games are the multiplayer generalization of optimal stopping problems, in which each player independently chooses when to stop, and the payoff depends on who stops first and when. While the existence of $\varepsilon$-equilibria in two-player stopping games with integrable payoffs is known, the multiplayer case has remained open. We prove that every multiplayer stopping game in discrete time with integrable payoff process admits an $\varepsilon$-equilibrium for every $\varepsilon > 0$, provided the filtration is conditionally atomless. This condition is satisfied, in particular, when the underlying probability space is $\{0,1\}^{\dN}$ endowed with the uniform measure and its natural filtration. Our method also shows that every three-player stopping game, without the restriction to conditionally atomless filtration, admits an $\varepsilon$-equilibrium, for every $\varepsilon > 0$. The proof combines techniques developed for two-player stopping games and for multiplayer quitting games, with a key new insight: the richness encoded in a conditionally atomless filtration can substitute for an external public randomization device, allowing players to coordinate without an explicit coordination signal.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7225412203
Cites: 1
Cited by: 1
Related to: 10