SAE Theory of the Company · Paper 1: Investment / SAE 公司论 第一篇: 出资
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: The Prequel said that a company is not the shareholders' property. This paper asks what an investor is: what he holds, what the company owes him, and what limits his power. Germany's Bosch places about ninety-four percent of its share capital in a foundation, while about ninety-three percent of the voting rights are in the hands of another entity; in 2022 America's Patagonia handed all its voting shares (two percent of the total) to a trust set up to safeguard the company's purpose. The two cases show that earnings and control can be separated. What an investor holds are rights fixed by the class of shares, not ownership of the people in the company; a controlling vote is a position, and whoever holds it is subject to checks (GS1). The company tells investors, employees, users, partners and those who review it one and the same story; returns, information and exit are as agreed; the controlling party does not use control to dominate minority shareholders (GS2). "A person has no equivalent" constrains investors' votes: it is a line, made clear before investment, and not put on the scale of a vote; investors may change the direction, and once they do, the company falls outside this series' scope; whether to lock it in, and how tightly, is left to the rule layer (GS3). Section 172 of the UK Companies Act and Delaware's provisions on public benefit corporations show how the rule layer writes the various parties into directors' considerations and balancing; where this series parts from them is in the line and the scale. How close an investor's relation to the company is falls into degrees by the difficulty of leaving; the harder it is to leave, the more explanation and routes of questioning the company owes him, and the greater his power, the stronger the checks on it (GS4). Finally the paper speaks of direction: investment can also be cultivation, but neither a long term nor a low return proves it on its own. The paper has four propositions (GS1 to GS4), each stated at the end of its section and listed together at the end. 前置篇说,公司不是股东的财产。这一篇问出资人是什么:他持有的是什么,公司欠他什么,他的权力受什么限。德国的博世把约九成四的股本放在一家基金会,约九成三的表决权却在另一家实体手里;美国的巴塔哥尼亚 2022 年把全部带表决权的股份(占总股份的百分之二)交给一个为守住公司目的而设的信托。两件事说明,收益与控制可以分开。出资人持有的,是依股份类别而定的权利,不是对公司里的人的所有;控制性的表决是一个位置,谁持有,谁受制衡(GS1)。公司对出资人、员工、用户、伙伴与审它的人说同一个故事,回报、信息、退出照约定,控股的一方不拿控制去支配小股东(GS2)。"人没有等价物"约束出资人的表决:它是线,在出资之前讲明,不放进表决的天平里称;出资人可以改方向,改了,公司就出了这个系列的范围;锁不锁、锁多紧,交规则层(GS3)。英国《公司法》第 172 条与特拉华公益公司的规定,示范规则层怎样把各方写进董事的考虑与平衡;这个系列与它们分开的地方,在线与天平。出资人与公司的关系有多近,照离开的难度分程度;越难离开,公司欠他的说明与问路越多,权力越大,受的制衡越强(GS4)。最后说方向:投资也可以是涵育,可是长期与低回报都不单独证明它。全篇四条(GS1 至 GS4),各节末写出,篇末合列。 Related works(7) Relation Identifier Scheme Resource type Title References 10.5281/zenodo.23270384 DOI Publication / Preprint Not Crossing the Line (SAE Institution Theory, Paper 2) References 10.5281/zenodo.23874138 DOI Publication / Preprint Accumulation (SAE Political Economy, Paper 1) References 10.5281/zenodo.23874142 DOI Publication / Preprint Checks (SAE Political Economy, Paper 3) References 10.5281/zenodo.23874146 DOI Publication / Preprint Conversion (SAE Political Economy, Paper 4) References 10.5281/zenodo.23874150 DOI Publication / Preprint Growth (SAE Political Economy, Paper 5) References 10.5281/zenodo.19396633 DOI Publication / Preprint Kingdom of Ends vs Kingdom of Means: Phase-Transition Acceleration in the Age of AI (SAE Economics, Paper 6) References 10.5281/zenodo.24045716 DOI Publication / Preprint What a Company Is Not (SAE Theory of the Company, Prequel)
Author: Qin, Han
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7225448860