Whistleblowing, independent verification and corrective responsibility: a procedural analysis of the Hyogo case
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: This preprint examines when a public reporting procedure secures disclosure, independent verification and correction. A finite Bayesian game separates personnel retaliation from the disclosure of private information. In a procedure with funded external investigation and contestable access, the paper gives necessary and sufficient conditions for reporting, access and correction, together with sharp conditions over independent parameter intervals. The numerical files check the stated implications by exact arithmetic and enumeration of primitive action plans. A documentary application examines three public reports concerning Hyogo Prefecture. It distinguishes findings on individual allegations, the treatment of the reporter, private-information disclosure, and inferences about senior officials' involvement. The reports provide evidence on particular institutional practices; they do not identify their effects on voting or present political division. The numerical examples are stipulated illustrations, not estimates of the actors' payoffs, beliefs or legal compliance. The accompanying archive contains the manuscript source, bibliography, reproduction code, stipulated parameters, numerical outputs, documentary chronology, evidence matrix and source manifest. Public report PDFs and private information are not redistributed. The evidence cut-off is 8 November 2026.
Author: Takashi, Matsuhisa
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7225580279