Venceremos Mdain a Theory of Absolute Freedom and Humanlimitations
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Freedom is a fundamental issue in philosophy, as it concerns the will, choice, the capacity to act, human limitations, and responsibility. Philosophical debates regarding freedom have evolved through various concepts, including negative freedom, positive freedom, free will, the ability to do otherwise, and sourcehood. This article proposes the "Venceremos Mdain" theory—a conceptual framework that views freedom, at its most fundamental level, as a state devoid of obstacles to the will and the realization of that will. The theory distinguishes between "specific freedom" and "absolute freedom." Specific freedom refers to freedom within a particular domain, whereas absolute freedom denotes a state entirely free from any obstacles or limits imposed upon the will and its realization. Given this distinction, human beings may possess freedom in various aspects of their lives, yet they cannot attain absolute freedom, as they remain inherently subject to limitations. This article employs a conceptual-philosophical analytical method, comparing the Venceremos Mdain theory with the concepts of negative freedom and the discourse on free will. The novelty of this theory lies not in the claim that the relationship between freedom and the absence of obstacles is being discussed for the first time, but rather in the systematic differentiation between specific and absolute freedom, and in the positioning of the "realization of the will" as a crucial element in the definition of absolute freedom. Furthermore, the article distinguishes philosophical conclusions regarding human limitations from metaphysical-theological developments concerning the Creator. The analysis indicates that while human beings can be considered free in a specific sense, they do not meet the criteria for absolute freedom.
Author: snanfi, musa noldi
Language: English
Topic: Free Will and Agency
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7225626937
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