Grounding Affect in Agentivity: Manipulating Sense of Agency and Decision-Making to Identify Behavioral and Intracranial Neurocomputational Signatures of Depression
Year: 2026
Type: book
Abstract: Major depressive disorder is widely recognized clinically, yet its explanation remains elusive. Its heterogeneity, variable treatment response, and overlap across affective, cognitive, motivational, and self-referential symptoms have made it difficult to localize within any single domain. This dissertation examines one possible reason for that difficulty: affect, agency, and decision-making are typically investigated in relative isolation. Across theoretical, behavioral, and intracranial computational levels of analysis, this dissertation asks whether these domains can be related more systematically through agentivity: the ways in which one is oriented as an agent toward the world. To this end, I develop a multi-level account of affect grounded in agentivity, with depression as the main clinical case. Over the last decades, the interdisciplinary study of affect has seen the proliferation rather than integration of theoretical perspectives thanks to differences in metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions about what affective phenomena are and how they work. Chapter 2 addresses the problem of affect itself by developing the Human Affectome framework in collaboration with over 170 affective researchers. Here, an assumption about the purpose of affect is leveraged as a teleological principle to synthesize a common set of metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions about affective phenomena. In particular, affective phenomena can be organized into concerns—which are manners of being oriented actionably toward the world—or features—which are dimensions that characterize that agentivity. This framework therefore offers a principled agenda and launchpad for both organizing existing perspectives and generating new ones, suggesting that disorders such as depression can be reinterpreted through the lens of agentive organization. Chapter 3 investigates whether implicit sense of agency—operationalized as the intentional binding effect in an interval estimation task—can be manipulated via morphosyntactic priming. Participants completed trials in which they either pressed a button themselves or observed the computer press it for them, after which a fixed delay occurred followed by an auditory tone. They then estimated the interval between action and outcome using a continuous slider. These events were preceded by sentence primes crossing Voice (Active, Passive) with Point of View (1st, 2nd, 3rd, and Agentless)—with agentless active primes taking the form of unaccusative constructions and agentless passive primes omitting the by-phrase. Depressive symptom severity was also modeled as a clinical moderator. Linear mixed-effects models replicated the intentional binding effect in both baseline and linguistic trials, with self-initiated actions associated with more negative estimation error than computer-initiated actions. Contrary to preregistered hypotheses, Voice and Point of View did not significantly modulate intentional binding in the full model. In addition, follow-up analyses suggested that depressive symptom severity did not attenuate intentional binding globally; rather, binding remained broadly consistent across conditions. However, intentional binding was selectively flattened after first-person active voice priming at high depressive symptom severity, suggesting a context-dependent relation between depressive symptoms and morphosyntactic framing of implicit agency. Chapter 4 characterizes the intracranial EEG spectral signatures of uncertainty about what to do as a computational quantity under active inference. Ten patients with refractory epilepsy completed a three-armed bandit task during stereotactic EEG monitoring. An active inference model that was selected via BIC over reinforcement learning and Bayesian alternatives captured participant behavior by minimizing expected free energy to ascertain posterior beliefs for the three available action policies. Within this framework, decision uncertainty was quantified as the Shannon entropy of the action policy posterior probability distribution, with belief updating as the Kullback–Leibler divergence between posterior and prior outcome likelihoods. Expected free energy was further decomposed into the motivation for information gain (i.e., epistemic value) vs. reward gain (i.e., pragmatic value), with a free parameter for individual differences that scale the balance between them. In addition, trial-wise local field potentials were decomposed into aperiodic and periodic components using irregular-resampling auto-spectral analysis (IRASA) and analyzed with linear mixed-effects regression based on the winning active inference model. Decision uncertainty, belief updating, epistemic value, and pragmatic value showed distributed aperiodic and periodic intracranial EEG signatures across temporal, prefrontal, and cingulate regions. In particular, aperiodic slope and offset in the middle temporal gyrus (MTG) were found to track decision uncertainty and, more specifically, pragmatic value. Exploratory clinical analyses further showed that MTG aperiodic offset differentiated depressive and anxious symptom severity—increasing with pragmatic value as depressive symptoms were more severe, while decreasing with pragmatic value and anxious symptoms. MTG theta power also tracked decision certainty, while the center frequency for both theta and alpha bands in the superior temporal gyrus (STG) tracked belief updating. These findings suggest that uncertainty about what to do has distributed intracranial EEG signatures whose epistemic and pragmatic contributions are both electrophysiologically and clinically dissociable. Finally, Supplementary Chapter 6 extends this dissertation’s interest in actionability, signal processing, and differentiated experience toward the broader question concerning the physical basis of consciousness—proposing that multiplexing in the brain’s electromagnetic signal may better account for the simultaneity of distinct experiences than explanations based in neural code, such as neural networks. Collectively, these chapters situate theoretical, behavioral, and intracranial computational levels of understanding depression in relation to each other, converging on agentivity as the organization of actionability. What may be altered in depression is therefore not merely mood, reward, cognition, or decision-making, but the landscape of actionability itself—how it is organized, differentiated, flattened, abstracted, and navigated under inherent uncertainty. This dissertation cuts across affect, agency, uncertainty, and consciousness in a principled and empirically tractable way, offering a framework for explaining depression parsimoniously: depression may not merely be a disorder of affect, perception, or decision-making—but a disorder of agentivity.
Author: Yu, Alessandra Nicoletta Cruz
Language: English
Topic: Free Will and Agency
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7225679238
