Relayism: A Philosophy of Cognitive Succession
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Relayism proposes that no biological or artificial substrate has a permanent entitlement to cognitive authority. Delegation should respond to demonstrated, domain-specific competence while preserving legitimate authorization, external correction, continuity obligations, and practical means of revocation. Its central rule recognizes two failures: transferring responsibility to an unready successor and withholding an adequately justified transfer. The costs of both depend on the domain and can be irreversible. This paper distinguishes cognitive reliance and delegated operations from political sovereignty, and distinguishes evidence justifying a handoff from the financial or institutional mechanisms implementing it. A correction seat must remain effective after transfer; plurality is a possible means, not a demonstrated guarantee. A hypothetical bounded delegation illustrates the institutional requirements without claiming to solve the general scorer problem. Michael S. Moniz is author of record. Original rendering credit: Claude; editorial and literature assistance for this edition: ChatGPT. This author-approved working paper reports no experiment or independent peer review. Version 0.4 is dated 10 November 2026; the unchanged v0.3 source has an internal date of 8 August 2026 and a public reading release dated 21 October 2026. The original checkpoint prediction is preserved as a dated conjecture, not an operationally registered forecast. Source and public reading page: https://suposystem.ai/the-axis-series/ax-47-relayism/ CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 applies to the author's original material; cited third-party works retain their own rights.
Author: Moniz, Michael S.
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7225731681
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