The Camouflage of Gemeinschaft: Asymmetric Objective Functions and Hierarchical Control under Information Hacking
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: This paper analyzes strategic rent extraction and signaling models in associational societies under information asymmetry. Building on classical sociological concepts of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft, this study formalizes a three-stage phase transition model using asymmetric objective functions and Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium structures. We demonstrate how rational upper-level actors utilize communal signaling to maintain hierarchical control and extract surplus behind communal rhetoric, and derive the Bayesian observability rank condition required to destabilize this pooling equilibrium.
Author: Name, Your
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7225860615
