Work

The Opt-In Radius Auction: An Exact Two-Sided Hypergraph- VCG Mechanism for Multi-Passenger Ride-Sharing

Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Ride-sharing platforms usually apply a single pickup radius to every passenger and price pooled trips with one common rule, although passengers differ in how far they will travel to be picked up and in how much they value sharing. This paper proposes the Opt-In Radius Auction (ORA), an exact two-sided hypergraph Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism in which each passenger reports a solo valuation, a shared-ride valuation, a maximum pickup distance, and a maximum detour, and each driver reports a private reservation value. Under exact winner determination, quasi-linear utilities, and genuine hard acceptability bounds, ORA is dominant-strategy incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational on both sides; budget balance is not imposed and the platform deficit is reported as an outcome. The mechanism is evaluated on paired synthetic markets and on semi-synthetic Manhattan demand estimated from 15.15 million New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission trip records. At a 2.0 km global radius, a VCG ablation raises nominal welfare from 92.85 to 112.25 and the match rate from 59.17% to 75.50%, but serves 33.23% of its passengers beyond their true pickup limits, against 0% for ORA. The computational bottleneck at larger scale is the Clarke-payment counterfactuals rather than the allocation itself.
Language: English
Subfield: Transportation
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7225894670
Cites: 24
Cited by:
Related to: 10