Bringing Dark Money into the Light: Government Experienced Directors and Political Spending Disclosure
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Companies have increased political activities through “dark money” donations to political action committees and by hiring government experienced directors (GEDs) to their boards. This had become pressing with court decisions opening unlimited campaign funding and the United States government rescinding executive orders governing post-employment ethics restrictions for political appointees. Bringing former government officials on to a board can yield political connections which benefit firms via preferable regulations and government contracts. However, the “revolving door” nature of government experienced directors can produce a principal-agent problem of diverging interests between the GEDs and the firm. This study examines the relationship of GEDs to corporate political spending disclosure at S&P 500 firms from 2017–2020. The study contributes to our understanding through the creation of a more comprehensive database of GEDs and by using quantile regression methods. Quantile regression shows that the effect of adding a GED to a board for firms at a low level of disclosure is twice as powerful as at the mean and for firms at the higher end of the disclosure distribution, the effect of adding a GED is only one-tenth the mean impact. Results suggest adding GEDs to boards will best increase disclosure rates for firms at low rates of disclosure. Firms which engage in intensive lobbying activities are also less likely to increase disclosure rates when they add GEDs to their board. If high levels of political disclosure are desired then increased regulation or stakeholder pressure may be necessary to increase transparency of firms’ political activities. JEL: G34, G38, M12, L20
Source: Research Square
Authors: Michael Quinn, Tyler Wasson
Institutions: Bentley University, Assumption University, Assumption University
Language: English
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7225907285
