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The Catastrophe of Gemeinschaft: An Evolutionary Game Model of Agitation and Social Phase Transition

Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: This paper presents a stochastic mathematical framework formulating the abrupt phase transition from a rule-based associational society (Gesellschaft) to a totalitarian community of fate (Gemeinschaft). While classical sociology and legal philosophy have described these states qualitatively, the non-linear catastrophic dynamics of social collapse require rigorous quantification. We construct a micro-foundation based on an infinitely repeated game in which the subjective discount factor decays dynamically as a function of perceived environmental stress, and couple this evolutionary replicator dynamics with an Itô stochastic differential equation (SDE) subject to multiplicative noise. Using Feller’s boundary classification, we prove the absorbing nature of the homogeneous boundaries and analytically derive the effective potential from the corresponding Fokker–Planck equation. Furthermore, we introduce a macroscopic upper-level player (Gesellschaft elite) capable of modulating perceived stress through strategic information manipulation (agitation). Formulating a hierarchical optimal control problem via singular perturbation theory (Slow–Fast dynamics) that incorporates long-term economic contraction, we prove that driving the population past a critical saddle-node bifurcation point into a state of total mobilization emerges as a unique Nash equilibrium for the upper-level player. Finally, we derive abstract dynamical conditions for structural stability against such phase transitions.
Author: Name, Your
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7225917902
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