Human Consciousness in the SRE Framework — Autonomy, the Feeling of Free Will, and Civilizational Accumulation
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Within the framework of Status–Relational Entropy (SRE) dynamics (https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23720861), this paper gives a structural derivation concerning human consciousness. The derivation introduces no new entity beyond the axioms of that framework, and answers only three questions: why consciousness possesses autonomy relative to external description; how that autonomy acts upon the material world; and why human beings generate the subjective feeling of "free will". There are five main conclusions. First, autonomy is not an exception to causal law but the kernel of a many-to-one surjective homomorphism: external description cannot uniquely determine internal state, and the difference can be measured by the conditional mutual information A = I(X ; Y' | Y, u). Second, "drive" comes from the local decrease of the per-channel free energy F = ln(B/(ΛD)); since SRE has no Hamiltonian generator (Proposition 5), this decrease is not a global gradient flow, and therefore history has no teleology. Third, "initiation" occurs at local frustration points: as E_local → 0 the dormancy probability tends to 1/2, branches become near-degenerate, and the endogenous decision gate resolves the branch together with the internal state. Fourth, consciousness can act on the world only through the boundary; a single boundary bit can recruit a material loop of about 10²³ steps, but the lever ratio of 10¹⁸–10²⁰ thus obtained is a conditional estimate depending on hypothetical parameters, not a measured value. Fifth, the feeling of free will is a necessary rendering of the self-model when four conditions are satisfied simultaneously, and its four components correspond respectively to "I", "I could have done otherwise", "I did it", and "no one forced me". This paper also gives neuroscience corroboration: temporal-order experiments on motor intention, intentions evoked by electrical stimulation, alien hand and the sense of being controlled, the interpreter phenomenon in split-brain patients, the default mode network, and thalamic gating. These findings are compatible with the structural picture above, but they do not constitute a proof of SRE. This paper explicitly does not address the problem of qualia, nor does it claim that SRE has solved the 0–1 problem of the creation of causal space. 本文在状态-关系熵动力学(SRE)框架内(https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23720861),给出一套关于人类意识的结构性推演。推演不引入任何超出该框架公理的新实体,只回答三个问题:意识为何具有相对于外部描述的自主性;这种自主性如何作用于物质世界;以及人为何会产生"自由意志"的主观感受。 主要结论有五条。第一,自主性不是对因果律的例外,而是多对一满同态映射的核:外部描述无法唯一确定内部状态,其差值可用条件互信息 A = I(X ; Y' | Y, u) 度量。第二,"驱动"来自逐通道自由能 F = ln(B/(ΛD)) 的局部下降;由于 SRE 不存在哈密顿生成元(命题 5),该下降不是全局梯度流,因而历史没有目的论。第三,"发起"发生在局部阻挫点:当 E_local → 0 时休眠概率趋于 1/2,分支近简并,内生判定门结合内部状态解析分支。第四,意识只能通过边界作用于世界;一个边界比特可招募约 10²³ 步的物质环路,但由此得到的 10¹⁸–10²⁰ 杠杆比是依赖假说参数的条件性估算,不是实测值。第五,自由意志感受是自我模型在四个条件同时满足时的必然渲染,其四个成分分别对应"我""可以否则""是我做的""没人强迫我"。 本文同时给出脑科学佐证:运动意图的时序实验、电刺激诱发的意图、异己手与被控制感、分裂脑的解释器现象、默认模式网络与丘脑门控等。这些证据与上述结构图像相容,但不构成对 SRE 的证明。本文明确不处理感受质问题,也不主张 SRE 已解决因果空间的 0-1 创生问题。
Author: Lu, Yue
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7225986269
