Work

Unequal Rewards and the Direction of Scientific Work: Evidence from U.S. Public Universities

Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Research on pay dispersion has long asked whether unequal rewards increase or depress performance. Tournament theory expects stronger effort, while social comparison accounts expect withdrawal. Both perspectives, however, treat performance as a single scale on which workers can be ranked. Scientific work often resists such ordering. Some contributions extend recognized lines of inquiry and can be evaluated against prevailing standards; others revise the frames through which value is judged and become legible only later. We argue that intellectual tournaments more readily reward the first kind of contribution than the second. Pay dispersion may therefore be associated not only with how much scholars produce but also with what kinds of intellectual exploration are encouraged. We test this argument with administrative payroll records for 105,050 tenure-line faculty in 4,839 departments at 93 U.S. public universities from 2004 to 2026, linked to publication histories in OpenAlex. For each department, we estimate a separate pay equation using rank, contract basis, and seniority, then measure the Gini of the salary variation this local ladder cannot explain. Scholars in departments with greater unexplained pay dispersion publish more papers and receive more citations, but their work is less disruptive, less novel, and more conventional. Additional analyses show that compensation premiums above the ladder go disproportionately to scholars with broad collaborations and topical breadth. Although the design cannot fully separate treatment from selection, the evidence shows that inequality is not only a distributional outcome but also an evaluative structure, shaping which forms of knowledge are recognized, rewarded, and reproduced within organizations and communities.
Author: Cao, Likun
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7225987365
Cites: 1
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Related to: 10