Regulatory architecture and the political economy of cybersecurity: A comparative analysis of banking governance in Türkiye and the United States
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: This study investigates how regulatory architecture shapes cybersecurity governance in the banking sectors of Türkiye and the United States through a structured comparative analysis of systemically important institutions. While highlighting the capacity of existing literature, this article argues that organisational structure and regulatory design are at least as important as resource capacity in shaping cybersecurity governance. Drawing on the frameworks of Institutional Complementarity and Varieties of Capitalism, the study operationalises key variables such as regulatory centralisation, compliance mechanisms and organisational capacity. The findings suggest that Türkiye's relatively centralised and consistent regulatory framework — anchored in a single prudential supervisor (the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, BDDK) within a layered structure that also includes cybersecurity and data-protection authorities — appears to promote regulatory clarity and coordination, which may partly offset resource constraints — a hypothesis that the study does not test directly. In contrast, the United States’ fragmented multi-agency structure, despite significant financial and technological advantages, gives rise to regulatory complexity and coordination costs. The analysis also suggests that cybersecurity in the banking sector exhibits characteristics of market failure, including insufficient investment and negative externalities, which supports the case for mandatory state intervention. By linking regulatory design to corporate behaviour and systemic risk management, the study contributes to the political economy of cybersecurity governance. The findings highlight the importance of regulatory consistency and international coordination in combating international cyber threats and ensuring the resilience of the financial system.
Source: Lectio Socialis
Authors: Furkan Yıldız, Ahmet Oğuz Akgüneş
Institution: Kırklareli University
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: cybersecurity governance, banking regulation, regulatory architecture, prudential supervision, United States banking regulation, institutional complementarity, varieties of capitalism, organizational capacity, compliance mechanisms, market failure, systemic risk, financial system resilience, international regulatory coordination, Turkey, United States
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W7225994324
