Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: In many strategic settings, agents can influence opponents by selectively disclosing truthful information about their own future actions. We introduce a game-theoretic framework to model this phenomenon. As a case study, we consider a two-player, alternating-move epistemic game in which Player A evaluates actions under a conservative maximin rule, while Player B-the manipulator-leverages this behavior by strategically revealing commitments. We prove that the manipulator can implement every inducible outcome using at most n disclosures in a binary game of depth 2n with n decisions per player. This establishes a sharp contrast between the game tree's exponential size and the linear amount of information required to control the outcome, highlighting a general mechanism by which limited information can exert disproportionate strategic influence.
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Authors: Artemov, Sergei, Prud'homme, Benjamin
Institutions: The Graduate Center, CUNY, City University of New York
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7225997620
