Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: This paper studies time-inconsistent linear-quadratic mean-field games governed by stochastic evolution equations in Hilbert spaces. The time inconsistency arises through the dependence of the cost functional on the initial time, while the mean-field interaction enters through the mean of the state distribution. By employing a multiperson differential game approach, we show that the closed-loop equilibrium strategy admits an affine feedback representation characterized by an operator-valued Riccati equation and a novel coupled forward-backward equilibrium system. We establish the existence and uniqueness of mild solutions to the equilibrium system and hence the existence of a closed-loop equilibrium strategy.
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Author: Qian, Hongjiang
Institution: Wayne State University
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: Wayne State University
OpenAlex ID: W7226015776
