Work

Contractual Structure and Obvious Manipulation in Many-to-Many Matching

Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: We study how contractual structure affects worst-case and best-case obvious manipulation in many-to-many matching with substitutable preferences. Efficient individually rational mechanisms rule out best-case obvious manipulations on both the full substitutable domain and the unitary domain. Under simple and economically natural conditions on hospitals' choices, every stable mechanism on the full domain admits obvious manipulations in both cases; hospital-proposing deferred acceptance can admit both types even under unitary doctors' preferences. A further sufficient condition makes efficient stable-dominating mechanisms obviously manipulable in the worst case. On the unitary domain, doctor-proposing deferred acceptance is not obviously manipulable. If each doctor--hospital pair has at most one feasible contract, this positive conclusion extends to every stable-dominating mechanism.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7226029419
Cites: 1
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Related to: 10