Social Normativity Without Realism: A Fictionalist Challenge
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: I challenge forms of social normativism that treat social normative entities—deontic statuses, deontic powers, and social norms—as indispensable to the explanation of action. I distinguish two roles these entities are said to play: causal and justificatory. Against the causal role, I argue that every causal explanation invoking social normative entities has a corresponding explanation that does not. Against the justificatory role, I argue that social scientists can adopt a methodological fictionalist stance toward justificatory explanations without thereby incurring ontological commitment. Realists therefore owe an account of why ontological commitment remains necessary for explanation.
Author: Erim Bakkal
Institution: University of California, Irvine
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,650
OpenAlex ID: W7226498075
