Work

Algorithmic Gatekeepers: Artificial Intelligence, Financial Intermediation, and the Disruption of China’s IPO Market

Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Initial public offerings in China pass through a dense chain of gatekeepers: sponsors, auditors, exchange reviewers, the securities regulator, and a retail-dominated investor base. Artificial intelligence now enters every link in that chain at once. It writes disclosures, verifies them, screens them for regulators, informs the investors who price them, and increasingly forms the core of the issuers that seek listing. This paper develops a theory of how AI disrupts an IPO market that operates as a state-orchestrated certification system. Drawing on signaling theory, the economics of certification, institutional theory, and the view of AI as an entrepreneurial actor, we argue that AI lowers the cost of producing information while leaving the cost of producing credible information intact. Seven propositions trace where the residual cost of credibility moves: toward an inverted U-shaped link between AI-generated disclosure and informativeness, a shift in intermediary rents from reputation to verification, an advantage for algorithmically legible issuers, an earlier inflection point in the effect of positive sentiment on IPO performance, attribution-dependent penalties for AI issuers, scope-contingent gains for intermediaries, and state pacing as a boundary condition. The theory explains why AI can raise market throughput and lower signal informativeness at the same time.
Author: Jin Yang
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7228486659
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