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Fei Qian in the United Kingdom? Chinese Informal Value Transfer Systems and the Conceptual Blind Spot in British Financial Investigation

Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Chinese informal value transfer systems — Fei Qian, or Dixia Qianzhuang — were identified by the National Crime Agency in 2019 as a money-laundering threat connected to the Daigou trade. Yet no publicly available British case reconstructs how such a network clears value between the United Kingdom and China, and the term "Fei Qian" is almost entirely absent from UK official vocabulary. This article asks why institutional recognition has not produced investigative capacity. Drawing on parliamentary written evidence from a former UK Fiscal Crime Liaison Officer in Beijing, peer-reviewed research on Chinese informal currency exchange in Britain, court reporting of enforcement outcomes, and the comparative European record, it argues that the gap is conceptual rather than evidential. Because the phenomenon has no differentiated category in national risk assessment, no intelligence requirement is formulated, no indicators are calibrated, no dialect-capable capacity is commissioned, and the absence of results is then read as confirmation that the threat is absent. The British evidence establishes a domestic cash-pooling and currency-conversion infrastructure but not the international settlement leg, and the Daigou–criminality nexus remains contested. Five practice recommendations follow, including a dedicated threat category, revision of the placement-layering-integration model, dialect-capable capacity, and recalibration of suspicious activity reporting.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7230506153
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