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Where Does the "I" Go? What the Absence of a Remembered Interval Does and Does Not Tell Us

Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: After general anesthesia, a person may remember nothing between the last moment before induction and the first remembered moment after waking. It is tempting to treat this absence as evidence that something else was absent in the interval: experience, or perhaps the subject itself. This paper argues for a more limited conclusion. The absence of a remembered interval establishes a gap in retrospective access; by itself it does not establish a gap in experience or in subject presence. Three questions that ordinary language compresses into the single word "continuity" are separated: whether experience was present throughout the interval, whether a subject was present throughout it, and whether the person before and after the interval is the same person. A mathematical appendix treats continuity as an identifiability question relative to an observation channel and an admissible class of histories. If observationally indistinguishable histories differ in experiential or subject continuity, that continuity is not identifiable from the channel alone. Physiological or behavioral evidence can refine the inference, but a conclusion about subject presence requires an explicit bridge principle. No theory of consciousness is proposed: the result concerns the limits of a specified kind of evidence, not the limits of consciousness itself.
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7231379264
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