Work

Digital Platforms: Faceless Power Without Accountability

Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: This essay argues that contemporary legal systems have built robust guarantees against public power but no equivalent mechanisms against private actors that perform materially public functions. Dominant digital platforms decide what circulates, what is seen and what disappears, yet legal doctrine classifies them as private companies without public-interest obligations. Drawing on hypothetical but recurrent cases —a filmed play removed as "incitement to violence," a defamation victim unable to make Mexican justice effective against a defendant abroad, automated moderation that misreads Mexican Spanish— the essay identifies three deficits: platforms lie beyond effective jurisdictional reach, their decisions escape proportionality review, and their legal nature is deliberately ambiguous, combining a common carrier's immunity with a publisher's power. It describes this ambiguity as a "dissociative disorder of legal personality," technically a form of fraud on the law. As a remedy, it proposes reclassifying dominant platforms as services of general interest under a concession regime with an independent regulator, which would make them subject to the Mexican amparo, together with a mandatory separation between the platform as carrier and as publisher. Against the objection that such regulation invites tyranny, it argues that the real alternative is not between the State and freedom, but between a government one votes for and foreign governments one does not. The file contains the English version followed by the original Spanish text.
Language: English
Subfield: Law
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7233586550
FWCI:
Cites:
Cited by:
Related to: