From First Prize to Complete Break: Key Recovery in the NSU Fully Homomorphic Cryptosystem (RusCrypto 2015)
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: The Rise and Fall of the NSU "Fully Homomorphic" Cryptosystem In 2015, at RusCrypto (the main cryptographic conference in Russia, the central industry event for information security), a paper by Vera Egorova and Darya Chechulina from the Laboratory of Modern Computer Technologies at Novosibirsk State University (NSU) took first place by a wide margin in the paper competition. They beat out approximately 50 submissions, primarily from leading Moscow universities (MSU, MEPhI, MIPT, Bauman). The work presented a public-key cryptosystem built on top of a "fully homomorphic encryption" (FHE) scheme, which was later cited in Russian surveys (e.g., Minakov 2020; Babenko-Rusalovsky 2021) and academic databases as an example of a domestic fully homomorphic system. The original scheme gained attention for its claimed properties: a public multiplication table, non-deterministic encryption, and no growth in ciphertext dimension under multiplication. This preprint presents a complete break. We show that the public key of the NSU scheme determines the secret vector k up to a linear system over Z_m. The public parameters w1, w2, u1, u2 yield two linear equations on k, while the public multiplication table gamma yields linear equations whose right-hand sides are the monomials k_i * k_j. For n = 2 the secret key is recovered by inverting a public 2x2 matrix; for n > 2 the resulting overdetermined system is solved by Gaussian elimination over Z_m (or after recovering m from determinants). Once k is known, every ciphertext is decrypted by a single inner product, and ciphertexts for arbitrary plaintexts can be forged. The attack runs in polynomial time in n and log m and requires no oracle access. Significance: The vulnerability is structural, not a mere implementation error. Properties presented as security features—the public table gamma, non-commutativity, non-associativity, and "non-determinism"—are the very source of the leak. This work demonstrates that the NSU construction cannot serve as a basis for secure cloud computing, despite its claimed applicability and its first-prize award at RusCrypto 2015. Reference implementation: The full Python code, including tests and numerical examples, is available at https://github.com/kawoshinerr/nsu-fhe-key-recovery
Author: Lesin, Andrei
Language: English
Subfield: Computer Networks and Communications
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7233595635
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