SiteSurveyor: A Hybrid On-Chain/Off-Chain Architecture for Secure and Verifiable Surveying Systems
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: A field survey leaves a trail: a quote, a crew schedule, observations, photographs, CAD drawings, an invoice, a payment. In most practices that trail is broken across paper field books, spreadsheets, shared drives and separate accounting software, so the deliverable handed to a client can no longer be tied to the record it came from. I built SiteSurveyor to close that gap. It is an open-source reference architecture, released as a multi-tenant workspace where projects, jobs, quotes, invoices, evidence and payments share one PostgreSQL database guarded by row-level security. Confidential files stay off-chain. Solana is used only where the database cannot give the guarantee on its own: wallet sign-in, stablecoin settlement, and wallet-signed SHA-256 digests that let a third party confirm a file is byte-identical to the one anchored, without seeing its contents. Every anchoring attempt, success or failure, lands in an append-only ledger that database triggers protect from edits. An AI assistant works the same records through a typed, allowlisted tool surface, reads back what it wrote, and asks before deleting anything; a separate Python worker screens open earth-observation imagery into ranked field targets. This paper gives the design, maps the cybersecurity risks of surveying practice onto the controls that answer them, states plainly what an anchored digest does not prove, and lists the automated checks (over 850 TypeScript tests and 124 edge-function tests) that hold those claims to account. Three pieces are meant to be lifted out and reused: the tenant-scoped data core, the evidence-anchoring service, and the allowlisted agent tool surface.
Author: Mangena, Consolation
Language: English
Subfield: Information Systems
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7234041640
