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Agency Cost and Audit Fee Lowballing Decision of Listed Industrial Goods Firms in Nigeria

Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: This study examined the association between agency-cost proxies and the audit fee lowballing decision of listed industrial goods firms in Nigeria. The specific objectives were to determine the effect of operating efficiency, asset utilization efficiency, managerial opportunism and free cash flow discipline on audit fee lowballing. Anchored on agency theory, the study adopted an ex-post facto research design and drew on the audited annual reports of eleven (11) listed industrial goods firms over the ten-year period 2015 to 2024, giving 110 firm-year observations. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation and ordinary least squares regression. The results showed that operating efficiency has a positive and significant effect on audit fee lowballing (β = 0.311, t = 3.091, p = 0.003), while asset utilization efficiency (β = 0.108, t = 1.077, p = 0.284), managerial opportunism (β = 0.112, t = 1.130, p = 0.261) and free cash flow discipline (β = 0.001, t = 0.012, p = 0.990) each have positive but insignificant effects. The overall model was significant (F = 2.531, p = 0.045) with an adjusted R² of 0.053, indicating that the agency cost proxies jointly explain a modest share of the variation in audit fee lowballing. The study concluded that audit fee lowballing among listed industrial goods firms in Nigeria is driven selectively by operating efficiency rather than by the full range of agency cost indicators. It recommended that firms strengthen operational cost controls and that regulators reinforce governance oversight so that opportunistic behaviour is more fully reflected in audit pricing.
Language: English
Subfield: Accounting
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7234043224
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