Work

Necessary causation in verificationism : From the Replacement of cause to the Criterion of Meaning

Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: This article examines the response of verificationism, as formulated by the Vienna Circle and logical empiricism, to David Hume's problem of necessary causation. It is the third piece in a series conceived as a situational overview of how epistemological schools have answered that problem, on which the author will develop his own analysis in a later article. It applies the same framework as the previous pieces: three levels of Hume's challenge (conceptual, epistemic and metaphysical) and a three-dimensional profile (what is justified, at what cost, and what becomes of the original question). Given the internal heterogeneity of the school, the response is presented as a range rather than a single point. The article argues that verificationism dissolves the conceptual and metaphysical levels by means of a criterion of meaning, according to which the "necessary connection" that goes beyond regularity lacks cognitive content; and that at the epistemic level its authors diverge (laws as rules, graded confirmation, pragmatic justification, elimination of the problem, nomological subsumption), so that this level is reformulated or left open depending on the author. Four objections are reviewed (the verifiability of universal laws, the status of the criterion itself, the analytic/synthetic distinction, and the status of necessity) along with the replies available in the literature. The assessment describes the verificationist answer as the move from methodological prohibition to the semantic purification of the question, not as a plain success or failure.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7234498663
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