Due Process and Proportionality by Design in Automated DNS Abuse Mitigation: Protecting Non-Commercial Registrants from Infrastructure-Level Collateral Damage
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: The April 2024 global amendments to the ICANN Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) and Base gTLD Registry Agreement (RA), together with European Union mandates such as Article 28 of the NIS2 Directive (Directive (EU) 2022/2555), oblige DNS intermediaries to act promptly on actionable abuse and to verify registration data at scale. Notably, while NIS2 Article 28 mandates data accuracy and robust verification, it does not prescribe automatic domain suspension; suspension for failed verification instead comes from contract, since the 2013 RAA lets a registrar verify manually or suspend when a registrant does not respond. Immediate, automated DNS-level suspension therefore remains an operational choice by contracted parties, and the question addressed here is how far fundamental-rights proportionality reaches that choice. In response to these pressures, registrars and registries increasingly delegate enforcement duties to automated threat-intelligence feeds, reputation blocklists, and heuristic triage pipelines. This paper argues that a blunt, domain-level suspension applied to a compromised legitimate domain, rather than to a domain that is maliciously registered, can constitute a disproportionate interference with fundamental rights, in particular the freedom of expression and association protected by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Articles 11 and 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and can leave registrants without the effective remedy guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter. The paper makes two contributions. First, a legal-normative analysis shows that, under the three-part proportionality test of Article 52(1) of the Charter, domain-wide suspension fails the "least restrictive means" requirement where the abuse is confined to a single URL path or a specific subdomain of an otherwise benign domain and a hosting-level remedy can end it in time, and sets out how far these rights reach a private registrar. Second, a socio-technical contribution operationalises this analysis: an instrumented data-collection and triage prototype (companion GitHub repository) and a three-tier "Proportionality-by-Design" protocol that translates the legal test into graduated, human-centred registrar actions with notification, cure periods, and a right to remedy. The empirical prototype is described transparently: its current snapshot (n = 26 flagged URLs from a collector capped at the first 25 rows of each of OpenPhish and URLhaus, with point-in-time RDAP lookups) is observational and descriptive only, and cannot yet estimate false-positive or wrongful-suspension rates; the paper therefore identifies the additional data (ICANN Contractual Compliance and Domain Metrica, Lumen, CZDS zone data, repeated RDAP and DNS observation, Tranco, verified registrant type) required to turn the design into a measurement instrument.
Source: SocArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Author: Yao Amevi Amessinou Sossou
Language: English
Subfield: Law
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7234729486
