Higher-Order Intensional Metaphysics
Year: 2026
Type: dissertation
Abstract: Traditional modal metaphysics involves the study of metaphysical theories and arguments using the tools of standard systems of modal logic, such as possible worlds semantics and the axioms of normal modal logics. A key feature of many higher-order modal logics is that they contain the principle Intensionalism, which identifies properties and propositions ("intensions") in terms of necessary co-extensiveness and necessary equivalence. This principle is controversial, in part because some think that necessarily equivalent or necessarily co-extensive expressions may differ in "content" or "meaning" in a way relevant to metaphysics, where there has been a demand in much recent metaphysics for use of languages with more fine-grained notions of content. In this dissertation, I defend Intensionalism by proposing various metaphysical theories that are compatible with Intensionalism and showing that each theory resolves a range of extant philosophical problems in metaphysics. More specifically, I provide higher-order intensional theories of (i) modality, (ii) the laws of nature, and (iii) ground. In Chapter 1, I first provide a theory of nomic modality. Nomic modalities are relative objective modalities that are restricted to laws of nature that characterize some domain of fact. Examples of these modalities include physical possibility/necessity and biological possibility/necessity. I argue that all nomic modalities obey the axioms of an S5 modal logic. One of my central arguments is that rival accounts of nomic modality are incompatible with standard views about the laws of nature, such as Humeanism or anti-Humeanism about the laws of nature. I argue that my account of nomic modality accommodates both Humeanism and anti-Humeanism about the laws of nature. In Chapter 2, I propose a Humean regularity account of laws of nature on which fundamental laws of nature are higher-order regularities featuring natural relations between natural properties. I argue that the account avoids problems faced by standard Humean accounts of laws of nature and also problems faced by standard anti-Human accounts of laws of nature. In Chapter 3, I investigate the modal principles of ground. I provide a principle concerning the dependence of the mental on the physical that is involved in ground and defend it against the problem of multiple realizability. My defense of this principle involves a notion of genus/species, where I provide an account of genus/species in terms of ground-theoretic dependence. The result is a picture of the mental and the physical that involves "two-way" necessitation, but one that still admits of some degree of multiple realizability.
DOI: 10.7282/t3-mqym-mk87
Author: Kofi, Zachary
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7234776268
