Work

One more round: The lasting economic cost if the US/Israel–Iran war reignites

Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: At the end of February 2026 the United States and Israel launched a surprise war against Iran that drew in the Gulfstates, and it has since settled into a stalemate: strikes have largely stopped since September, talks have stalled, andthe United States has threatened a new round of strikes that could plunge the Gulf into war again. We estimate whatthe conflict has cost so far and what it would cost if it reignites. The conflict cut Gulf output of crude oil, refinedproducts and aluminium, cut exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and urea fertiliser, cut Iran’s exports, and raisedthe cost of shipping energy through the Strait of Hormuz. We model these channels together, with the strait as oneamong several. We use a recursive dynamic (year-by-year) global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model,GTAP-RD (Corong et al., 2017; Aguiar, Corong and van der Mensbrugghe, 2019), on a 2022 global database builtfrom the OECD Inter-Country Input-Output tables, to estimate what the war costs and what six more months offighting would add. Two scenarios are compared with a no-war baseline: the war ends in 2026, or it reignites for sixmore months of fighting in 2027. The shocks are measured country by country from production, shipping and insur‐ance data, and enter the model mainly as lost Gulf oil and refining output. All GDP results are differences from aworld without the war: a result of −30% means that real GDP in that year is 30% lower than it would otherwise havebeen, not that the economy shrank by 30%. On this measure, in 2026 Qatar’s GDP is 30% lower than without thewar, that of Iraq, Kuwait and Bahrain (modelled as one group) 19% lower, Saudi Arabia’s 6.7% and the UAE’s4.8%. World GDP is 0.32% lower, and the GDP of the large Asian importers is up to 0.3% lower. We find that sixmore months of war would leave a lasting mark: Gulf GDP stays further below its no-war path for years after thefighting ends than if the war ends in 2026. In 2030, Qatar’s GDP would be 4.9 points lower than if the war ends in2026, that of Iraq, Kuwait and Bahrain 1.2 points lower, the UAE’s 0.45 points and Saudi Arabia’s 0.38 points.Applying the same disruption as a shock to exports rather than a shock to production gives smaller war-year lossesfor the Gulf Arab exporters and larger importer losses, though much of the extra importer loss comes from how theexport cut is modelled; we report it as a sensitivity. A separate short-run price model puts Brent crude 66% above itsno-war level in 2026; if fighting continues into 2027, Brent would average about $140 a barrel in 2027 if oil stocks(commercial and government) can be drawn as in 2026, against $84 if the war ends in 2026 and $53 with no war.
Author: David Radi
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7234855024
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