Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: This paper examines the agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction, a major but contested achievement in moral philosophy. It addresses three questions: the proper application of agent-relativity, whether the distinction is trivial, and whether it has been adequately formalized. It will reject the application of agent-relativity to values and ought-propositions but permit it in relation to reasons, theories, and rules. It will also defend the distinction’s substance against one objection which claims that all reasons are agent–relative. It will do this by distinguishing between real agent-relativity and a merely pseudo-agent-relativity. The existing attempts at formalizing the distinction as it applies to reasons are shown to be misguided. They do not fulfill the original motivation behind the distinction, due to what we will call the “derivability problem”: agent-relative reason-statements can be transformed into agent-neutral ones while retaining the same ethical content, and agent-neutral theories can generate derivative agent-relative reasons. The paper’s main thesis is then proposed: we should rethink agent-relativity as primarily a feature of comprehensive moral outlooks, not isolated reason-statements. A reason is agent-relative or agent-neutral only in relation to such an outlook. The essence of agent-relativity lies in the possibility of conflict between the injunctions and normative reasons of a given moral outlook. Consequently, the agent-relativity of a reason is secondary, to be understood only in relation to a moral outlook that renders it a true normative reason and determines its scope across agents. This new framework bypasses the derivability problem and restores the distinction’s philosophical significance.
Source: Research Square
Author: João da Rocha Rodrigues
Institution: University of Minho
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7234880574
