Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Richard Chappell offers an argument purporting to establish a new paradox for deontology. Chappell thinks he can show that deontologists must take deontological constraints to apply only to themselves and not to their preferences about how others act (a failure of what he calls “robustness”) or recognize that “deontology is false”. We provide a straightforward criticism of Chappell’s argument, showing that, as he articulates it, it is invalid because it relies on an unjustifiable claim about transitivity. But we do not content ourselves with pointing out this simple failure, which is independent of the nature of deontology. We draw attention to two substantive misconceptions about deontology that affect Chappell’s argument. First, his argument underplays the strength of preferences for respecting deontological constraints, as compared to violating them for the sake of consequentialist benefits. Second, his argument rests on the idea of a “generic murder”. But for a deontologist, the disvalue of a murder to a person assessing the value of the actions of another depends crucially on where it occurs in relationship to the agent whose actions are being assessed. There is no such thing as a “generic murder”, as Chappell uses the term. We think these are of general interest to anyone looking to properly understand deontology, including those who wish to weigh its appeal against consequentialist alternatives.
Source: Research Square
Authors: Alec Walen, Daniel Wellisch
Institution: Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7234951029
