Work

Biomimetic Transport Layer: Computationally Secure AONT-RS Fragmentation and Split-Observation Multipath Scheduling across Heterogeneous Interfaces

Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: This position paper introduces the Biomimetic Transport Layer, a conceptual network privacy and traffic obfuscation architecture designed for the Arcanum ecosystem. While cryptographic primitives and zero-knowledge proofs guarantee computational integrity, transmitting medium-to-large payloads (10 KB to 10 MB, such as post-quantum signatures, STARK proofs, and batched zero-knowledge proofs) across public networks exposes metadata through packet size distributions, inter-arrival timing, and single-ISP traffic correlation. To mitigate single-path network surveillance without relying on fragile static protocol mimicry, the proposed architecture combines three core mechanisms: Computationally Secure Polymorphic Fragmentation (AONT-RS): Payloads are processed through an All-or-Nothing Transform coupled with Reed-Solomon erasure coding (AONT-RS) and homophonic encoding expansion. Under the random oracle model, any adversary observing up to k-1 fragments across a single network path gains no computational information regarding the underlying payload. Constrained Reinforcement Learning Multipath Scheduling: Inspired by biological codon degeneracy and epigenetic channel silencing, an adaptive scheduler distributes fragments asymmetrically across physically and administratively independent network interfaces (such as local Wi-Fi ISPs and cellular carriers). The scheduler enforces a strict cardinality constraint ensuring no single network operator observes the k-fragment reconstruction threshold. Air-Gapped Constant-Time Air-Lock: To prevent remote prover state extraction and internal timing leakage, cryptographic proof generation and sanitizer operations are isolated within an air-gapped boundary. Verified payloads exit through a constant-time release buffer with adaptive cover padding, ensuring secret witnesses never enter the transport pipeline while complementing AG-ZKP randomized proof sanitization at the network boundary. Note: This document is published as a conceptual architectural position paper within the Arcanum Technical Monograph Series to outline the theoretical system design, threat model, and open evaluation challenges prior to empirical implementation. Version 2.2 Update Note & Correspondence This version incorporates formal threat model boundaries (including common-jurisdiction ISP constraints), the $(m-f)(k-1) \ge k$ fault-tolerance inequality requiring $m \ge 3$ independent paths for active link-loss resilience, strict unidirectional air-gap diode separation from external RL telemetry, the Chen–Laing–Martin (ePrint 2016/1014) AONT-RS security proof reference, and an explicit AI assistance disclosure. Author & Correspondence: Mert Atakan — [email protected] Project Repository: https://github.com/Sidistr/Arcanum
Author: Atakan, Mert
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7235156697
Cites:
Cited by:
Related to: 10