Advantage Alignment Does Not Preserve Mixed Nash Equilibria: A Machine-Checked Counterexample and an Exact Covariance Characterization
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Advantage Alignment (Duque et al., ICLR 2025) states that its alignment term vanishes at every Nash equilibrium. We construct a two-stage game whose unique Markov-perfect equilibrium is completely mixed and at which the update is nonzero; after one step the other player has a strictly profitable deviation. The alignment term equals a pre-action weight times the covariance between the agent's score and the welfare externality of its action on the opponent; the update is not invariant to strategic equivalence; and in normal-form games AA reads only the opponent's welfare externality whereas first-order LOLA reads only the interaction that changes the opponent's incentives. Main statements are machine-checked in Lean 4 with Mathlib. Advantage Alignment, its Equation 8 and Theorem 3 are the work of Duque, Aghajohari, Cooijmans, Ciuca, Zhang, Gidel and Courville.
Author: Panera Pascual, Alejandro
Institution: Universidad de Salamanca
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7235164938
