Reforming tropical forest finance to unlock large-scale cooperation
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: This is a pre-print of an article submitted to peer-review. Abstract We combine a calibrated model of jurisdictional forest-conservation rewards with a voluntary-contribution game to study reforms to the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF). At a donor cost of US\$1 billion yr⁻¹, direct funding, a uniform marginal reward and a budget-dependent reference level raise avoided emissions from about 9 to 40 MtCO₂ yr⁻¹. Using a global social cost of carbon of US$210 tCO₂⁻¹, the optimized mechanism implies an EU contribution of US\$0.8 billion yr⁻¹ and an EU–China coalition contribution of US\$6.7 billion yr⁻¹ purely based on self-interest. A binding 25% third-party match raises total funding to US\$13.1 billion yr⁻¹ and avoided emissions from 141 to 220 MtCO₂ yr⁻¹. Our results show how efficient reward design and conditional commitments can reinforce each other to mobilize international climate finance and deliver additional mitigation.
Language: English
Subfield: Global and Planetary Change
Field: Environmental Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7235416205
