The Metacognitive Underpinnings of Offloading Decisions
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: In five experiments, we investigated how people's metacognitive assessments influence their decisions about whether to rely on their own answers to questions or to obtain the answers from an external source (i.e., to offload). Participants provided answers to general information questions, rated their confidence, and then decided whether to stick with their answer or be given the correct answer by the computer. To examine how metacognitive accuracy impacts offloading, experiment 2-5 included condition which produced good resolution (using easy and difficult questions), and condition that produced poor resolution (using questions people typically think they know the answers to, but don’t). The value of offloading was also varied across experiments via the assignment of differing numbers of “points” for sticking or offloading. In all experiments, participants were told to maximize the number of points earned, allowing us to investigate whether people optimize offloading decisions. Across all five experiments, participants' confidence in their answers predicted whether they would offload or not: when confidence was high, they did not offload; when it was low, they offloaded. They did this even when their metacognition was faulty. Further, participants were relatively insensitive to the value of the options, even in a condition in which the rational choice to maximize points was to offload everything and ignore metacognition entirely. These findings indicate that, even when metacognitive evaluations are either wrong or irrelevant (rather than being correct and germane), people's offloading choices are strongly influenced by their metacognition.
Source: PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Language: English
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7235445823
