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Winning the prescription: competitive tenders versus decentralized competition

Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Payers increasingly use competitive tendering to reduce expenditures on patent‐protected pharmaceuticals. Using a duopoly model with horizontally differentiated drugs, we show that tendering can harm patients and fail to reduce costs. When demand depends on physicians' tolerance for treatment loss, tendering yields a mixed‐strategy equilibrium: firms balance bidding low to win the contract against bidding high to exploit residual demand. Compared with decentralized competition, tendering worsens patient outcomes and increases expected prices unless the treatment‐loss tolerance is sufficiently high. Quality asymmetries and captive segments further amplify these distortions, highlighting critical trade‐offs in procurement design.
Language: English
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,470
OpenAlex ID: W7235493606
FWCI:
Cites: 24
Cited by:
Related to: 10