Work

Geheimschutz im Parlament

Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Classified Information in Parliament This paper examines the mechanisms for protecting secrecy in parliament. Depending on whether parliament deals with internal secrets or with those shared by the executive branch, it is treated either as a monolith – meaning information can circulate freely within the institution – or as fragmented, which applies when the government shares information explicitly only with a particular body within parliament. In both cases, the scale of information sharing depends on official status (i. e., being an MP, a committee member, or a committee chair), not on an individual assessment of personal reliability. Recently, amid the rising risk of espionage carried out by MPs on behalf of foreign powers, there has been a proposal to introduce background checks for MPs. Whereas MPs do not currently need security clearance to access confidential documents, the result of such a check would determine their eligibility to serve on certain committees. The paper argues that introducing personal vetting of representatives would conflict with the principle of equality among MPs and, hence, be unconstitutional. Under the German constitutional framework, every MP is – in theory – able to assume every possible position in parliament and government. The paper shows that this potential is crucial to the functioning of party politics and that abolishing it would create hierarchies between representatives that constitutional law cannot justify. Instead, the paper proposes strengthening internal election procedures. Since being elected conveys trust, and politics is about trust, the paper concludes by calling for treating the assurance of secrecy as a political issue, not an administrative law matter.
Language: English
Subfield: Law
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W7235634962
FWCI:
Cites:
Cited by:
Related to: 10