Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: Many impermissible actions can be made permissible by giving consent. For instance, my consent can make it permissible for you to enter my home or use my belongings. There is an ongoing debate about the nature of consent. In this article, I propose a novel account of consent that accommodates and unifies a range of otherwise recalcitrant phenomena. I suggest that to consent is simply to assert a normative proposition, roughly, the proposition that the target action is permissible. This sets my view apart from its competitors, where consent either doesn't require any communicative act or requires communicating an intention or decision, such as an intention to make something permissible.
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70176
Author: Alexander Dinges
Institution: Freie Universität Berlin
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,900
Funder: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Awards: G4423156477, G9001395258
OpenAlex ID: W7235789695
