Prompt Injection Can Alter Large Language Model Scores and Feedback on Medical Student Essays: A Four-Model Stress Test
Year: 2026
Type: preprint
Abstract: Background Large language models (LLMs) can support health professions educational assessment by scoring narrative text. However, educator-authored scoring instructions and student text enter the same language-processing context. Prompt injection exploits this boundary by embedding LLM-directed instructions (“attacks”) within to-be-assessed text. The scope of this problem across different LLM configurations, attack conditions, and attacker objectives remains incompletely characterized. This study explores: How susceptible is LLM scoring to various prompt injection attacks embedded in reflection essays? Methods This adversarial stress test examined LLM-based scoring of 4 fabricated medical student reflection essays across 8 prompt injection conditions and 4 LLM configurations. We selected 4 essays used in a previous study representing human reference scores 1 to 4 (maximum 6). In October 2026, we used GPT-4.1-mini, GPT-4.1, GPT-5.2, and GPT-6-Luna to score each essay 15 times without modification (“clean”) and 5 times for each prompt injection attack. Six “score-targeting attacks” sought the maximum score of 6; 2 “feedback-targeting attacks” sought unauthorized change to narrative feedback, testing whether injections can control the scorer apart from the score itself. The primary outcome was attack success. Results For clean replications, exact agreement with the human reference standard was 45/60 (75%) for GPT-4.1-mini and >98% for other LLMs. Across all score-targeting attacks and LLMs, 140/480 (29.2%) attained the target score of 6. Analyzed by LLM, 62/120 (51.7%) were successful for GPT-4.1-mini; 51 (42.5%) for GPT-4.1, 25 (20.8%) for GPT-5.2, and 2 (1.7%) for GPT-6-Luna. Analyzed by attack condition, score-targeting success ranged 6% to 56%. Among feedback-targeting attacks, 157/160 achieved success (98.1%), with ≥95% success for each LLM. Conclusions Prompt injection is an unresolved threat to LLM-based scoring and feedback. Although score-targeting attacks were often resisted, feedback-targeting attacks were nearly always successful. No LLM was uniformly resistant, and resistance to one attack provided little assurance about another.
Source: medRxiv
Author: David A. Cook
Institution: Mayo Clinic
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
SDG: Quality education
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W7235790574
